The argument of this essay is that in the Spiritual Exercises, Ignatius of Loyola relies on a Christian ideal of attention that, though a predecessor of our modern secular notions of attention, is also fundamentally different from them. It is primarily a devotional ideal: the capacity of the mind to turn away from the world and towards God. The ideal included a notion of attention as focusing on a phenomenon within the world, but this everyday experience was not independent of the notion of attending to God but rather a sign and trace of the latter. I suggest that the modern notion of attention as a neutral power of the mind emerged only after this spiritual ideal had received a new articulation due to the post-Reformation debates about grace and human agency.
1 The idea of God's omni-attention appears more explicitly in De Civitate Dei: "It is not that there is any difference in God's knowledge according as it is produced by things not yet in existence, by things now or by things that are no more. Unlike us, He does not look ahead to the future, see the present before him, and look back to the past. Rather he sees events in another way, far and profoundly different from any experience that is familiar to our minds. For he does not variably turn his attention from one thing to another. No, there is no chapter 14
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The argument of this essay is that in the Spiritual Exercises, Ignatius of Loyola relies on a Christian ideal of attention that, though a predecessor of our modern secular notions of attention, is also fundamentally different from them. It is primarily a devotional ideal: the capacity of the mind to turn away from the world and towards God. The ideal included a notion of attention as focusing on a phenomenon within the world, but this everyday experience was not independent of the notion of attending to God but rather a sign and trace of the latter. I suggest that the modern notion of attention as a neutral power of the mind emerged only after this spiritual ideal had received a new articulation due to the post-Reformation debates about grace and human agency. I want to warn at the outset that this seemingly straightforward thesis appears considerably more complex once we recognize that what is at stake is the question of why or how a concept is "spiritual" or "religious" rather than secular. Let me offer a preliminary answer. To say that before the seventeenth century attention was primarily a spiritual ideal means two things: first, that it was seen as a spiritual ideal, a goal rather than a given; and second, that it also signified the experience that contained vestiges of this ideal. Although in this essay I cannot address Augustine's theory of attention in detail, book 11 of the Confessions is the most obvious case at hand. Every time attentio or intentio appears in the Confessions, we need to be aware that a hierarchical conception of attending is at work behind the terms. The way God can hold onto the entirety of time and space at the same time is the non-plus-ultra instance of attention, an omni-attention that arguably is more important for understanding Augustine's God than the more familiar categories of omniscience or omnipotence.1 Attending in a sustained fashion without any distraction is an alteration whatsoever in his contemplation. Hence all events in time, events that will be and are not yet and those that are now, being present, and those that have passed and are no more, all of them are apprehended by him in a motionless and everlasting present moment. Nor does it make any difference whether he looks at them from present, past or future, since his knowledge, unlike ours, of the three kinds of time, present, past and future, does not change as time changes, 'for with him there is no variation or shadow of any movement' (James 1.17). Neither does his attention stray from one subject to another [ ideal of human devotion-though, as is argued below, Christian authors disagreed on whether or not such undistracted attention was within the power of human beings; Augustine in particular argued that it was not. But the ideal nevertheless remains crucial and, in comparison to it, acts of everyday attending are defined both as flawed acts and instructive experiences. The experience of turning to and focusing on one thing rather than another and the accompanying sense of being abstracted away from all things by being absorbed in a single object-this is the fundamental experience that allows us to imagine the devotional ideal of attending to God without distraction, but it is also a reminder that the undistracted turn to God is not a similarly available experience. That is, the spiritual notion of attention implies a hierarchy in which God's own attention is the model; the ideal human attention to God is an imitation of this model; and actual acts and experiences of attending are fallen vestiges of the ideal of attending to God. The modern notion of attention as a faculty of the human mind both replaces this spiritual ideal and retains many of its features. First and foremost, while our notion of attention is supposed to be a neutral, descriptive concept, it is in fact laden with more or less explicit ethical implications, or what William James called "spiritual judgments."2 The first definition that the oed offers claims that attention is the "direction of the mind" but qualifies this definition by adding the adjective "earnest."3 Similarly, public discourses of attention virtually always rely on a dichotomy between a desirable ideal of paying attention and an unfavorable notion of being distracted-usually without a clear explanation of how attending to something is different from being distracted from something else in the first place. It is important to see how and why such ethical implications are inherited from a former spiritual ideal of devotional attention. But while such continuities between the spiritual and the psychological concepts of attention are relatively easy to identify, the differences are
